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LEGAL FORMALISM MEETS POLICY-ORIENTED
JURISPRUDENCE: A MORE EUROPEAN APPROACH
TO FRAME THE WAR ON TERROR
Julien Cantegreil*
I. INTRODUCTION
1

Myres S. McDougal, the leader of the New Haven School of International Law
(NHSIL), advanced a comprehensive and iconoclastic conception of international law
and its goals, one whose continuing influence is well-known today: a visceral ruleskepticism that even his least fervent disciples would never renounce. McDougal’s
conception of international law and its goals is fundamentally different from the
normativist view of Hans Kelsen, which has been and continues to be enormously
influential throughout continental Europe, particularly in France.2 In the portion of his
1953 course at The Hague Academy of International Law devoted to Kelsen’s
canonical Legal Technique in International Law,3 McDougal said that the jurist’s
function as “a responsible interpreter of the policy commitments embodied in legal
prescriptions and procedures,” and the jurist’s status as a “skilled specialist” of the
intimate workings of such prescriptions and procedures, prohibits the jurist from
limiting himself to the mere analysis of the “logical interrelations among legal

* École normale supérieure (Paris)/Université Paris I (Panthéon-Sorbonne). Editor of Pour une
Théorie des “Cas Extrêmes” (2006). Many thanks to Deans Harold Koh, Anthony Kronman, and Guido
Calabresi of the Yale Law School, as well as to Professors Bruce Ackerman, Pierre-Marie Dupuy, and Owen
Fiss for the numerous stimulating discussions and debates on the personal vision presented here. Lia
Brozgal’s responsiveness, culture, and sharp-minded skills exemplify the best of friendship. This Article
elaborates on ideas I either expressed at the Eighth International Summit on Transnational Crime, held in
Monte-Carlo, Monaco, in November of 2006, or will discuss in my forthcoming article, entitled Les Ages
de New Haven, to be published in volume 51 of Archives de Philosophie du Droit (2007). This Article is
dedicated to W. Michael Reisman. Pandere vela oratiÇnis.
1. (1906-1998) Sterling Professor of International Law, Yale University; President of the American
Society of International Law; Member of the Institut de Droit International; and representative of the United
States at numerous diplomatic conferences. See generally W. Michael Reisman, Myres S. McDougal,
Biographical Essay, in 18 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 479 (David L. Sills
ed., 1980).
2. Hans Kelsen’s views have generated considerable scholarly commentary. See, e.g., CARLOS
MIGUEL HERRERA, THÉORIE JURIDIQUE ET POLITIQUE CHEZ HANS KELSEN (1997); Otto Pfersmann, Contre
le néo-réalisme juridique. Pour un débat sur l’interprétation, 50 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT
CONSTITUTIONNEL 279 (2002); Michel Troper, Un système pur du droit: le positivisme de Kelsen, in LA
FORCE DU DROIT 117 (Pierre Bouretz ed., 1991). Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995) (confirming, by omitting any reference to Kelsen’s views in this comprehensive
survey, that his views have largely failed to find adherents in the United States).
3. HANS KELSEN, LEGAL TECHNIQUE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TEXTUAL CRITIQUE OF THE LEAGUE
COVENANT (1939). Kelsen claims that “jurists’ . . . determin[ation of] the social ends to be attained” is a
“usurpation of competence” insofar as the “question is not juridical but specifically political,” even “the
domain par excellence of the politician.” Id. at 15. At times, however, Kelsen has formulated policy for
application in a legal context. See, e.g., HERRERA, supra note 2 (presenting a policy-oriented appraisal of
Kelsen’s work); HANS KELSEN, La Technique du droit international et l’organisation de la paix, in HANS
KELSEN: ÉCRITS FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 251 (Charles Leben ed., 2001) [hereinafter KELSEN,
Technique].
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propositions.”4 He called for jurists to extend their roles “to the further tasks of inquiry
into and advice about the possible effects upon overall community values of the
various alternatives that the legal forms afford.”5 In addition, he imposed on legal
scholars the responsibility to “identify or invent and to recommend the prescriptions,
organizations, and decisions” that would converge in the effective development of an
international “law of human dignity.”6 By replacing the Kelsenian analytical distinction between “lawful and . . . unlawful” with a different programmatic distinction—
between “a law promoting human indignity or a law promoting human dignity”7—the
NHSIL was uniquely equipped to fulfill the function that McDougal ascribed to all
useful jurisprudential theory: “the formulation and the establishment of an international
law of human dignity.”8
It is no surprise that this approach, diametrically opposed to the Kelsenian spirit,
has had the effect of distancing the NHSIL from the central concerns of French
doctrine of public international law,9 which is “entirely concerned with the internal
functioning of the legal system,”10 and the interrelationships that bind together the
various elements of the international legal order. As Professor Prosper Weil masterfully articulated, French doctrine permanently demands quality in the normative
apparatus.11 When the NHSIL was not busy mocking the French dualistic approach,12
it simply ignored its doctrinal debates, such as those dealing with the improvement of
the normative apparatus, interpretation,13 the ideas of “the unity of the international
legal order,”14 and jus cogens.15 This ignorance was reciprocal. For its part, French

4. Myres S. McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82
RECUEIL DES COURS 137, 157 (1953).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 140.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 257.
9. French doctrine is unified in the sense that its central functions are, according to Prosper Weil, the
establishment and maintenance of nation states’ territoriality, coexistence, and cooperation. Prosper Weil,
Le Droit International en Quête de son Identité, 237 RECUEIL DES COURS 25, 35-38 (1992).
10. Jean Combacau, Le droit international: bric-à-brac ou système?, 31 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU
DROIT 85, 86 (1986) (translation by the author).
11. Weil, supra note 9, at 38 (“In a word: give me good normativity and I will give you good law.”)
(translation by the author).
12. See, e.g., Myres S. McDougal, The Impact of International Law upon National Law: A PolicyOriented Perspective, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 157, 161-62 (Myres S. McDougal ed., 1960)
(criticizing dualists’ attempts to “rigidify the fluid processes of world power interactions into two absolutely
distinct and separate systems or public orders, the one of international law and the other of national law”).
13. See generally SERGE SUR, L’INTERPRÉTATION EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1974).
14. See generally Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’Unité de l’ordre juridique international, 297 RECUEIL DES
COURS 25 (2002); Emmanuelle Jouannet, Le juge international face aux problèmes d’incohérence et
d’instabilite du droit international. Quelques réflexions à propos de l’arrêt CIJ du 6 novembre 2003,
Affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières, 108 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT’L PUB. 917 (2004)
(demonstrating her understanding of the Oil Platforms ICJ case); Karl Zemanek, The Legal Foundations
of the International System, 266 RECUEIL DES COURS 23 (1997). See also U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY
[GAOR], Study Group of the Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, ¶¶ 46-222, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (April
13, 2004) (prepared by Martti Koskenniemi) (outlining the debates on Article 31(3)(c) and its potential as
an integrating principle in treaty law, and the debates on lex spécialis in customary law).
15. Although jus cogens may have been a topic of interest in the United States—see, for example, Egon
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doctrine turned a blind eye to this new jurisprudence that seemed in a way to limit
itself to marshaling various critiques aimed at prevailing American doctrine.16 The
NHSIL’s new way of conceiving juridical order as a desacralized, instrumentalized,
and contingent tool of law provoked a discourse of resistance and defense of traditional
romano-germanic values.17 The NHSIL’s defense of universalism was deemed to be
ideological, moralistic, and the archetype of a dogmatic and quasi-missionary attitude.
It would be difficult indeed to find a better illustration of the absence of a “shared legal
culture.”18
As a result, French doctrine lost its capacity to understand certain developments
in American jurisprudence, from Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies19 to
the more recent Transnational Legal Process School.20 Strategically, French doctrine
was particularly impoverished by its inability to engage with a philosophy that was
developed by McDougal’s academically and professionally successful studentdisciples from the Yale Law School.21 Among his protégés were Michael Reisman,
future Professor of Law at the Yale Law School and future President of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States;
Florentine Feliciano, future President of the Supreme Court of the Philippines and
future Chairman of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization; and Dame
Rosalyn Higgins, future President of the International Court of Justice. Regardless of
one’s jurisprudential orientation, it is a problem to ignore such a major contribution,22
Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens As Formulated by the International Law Commission,
61 AM. J. INT’L L. 946 (1967)—no comparison can be drawn with French academics’ interest in the issue.
For progression from the initial rejection of jus cogens to its eventual promotion in France, see Combacau,
supra note 10, at 102-04 (advocating the creation of an objective system of international norms) and Weil,
supra note 9. See generally Dupuy, supra note 14, at 213 (highlighting the universality of international
law); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, L’individu et le droit international (Théories des droits de l’homme et fondements
du droit international), 32 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 119 (1987) (analyzing international law’s
shift in focus from policing the relations between states to protection of individual human rights).
16. When compared with one another, American theories of international law are apparently diverse.
See Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus
for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 291 (1999). However, the diversity of these approaches is substantially less
distinct when viewed from a European perspective. See UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003); GEORG NOLTE, LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL FACE AU DÉFI AMÉRICAIN (2005); Emmanuelle Jouannet, French and American
Perspectives on International Law: Legal Cultures and International Law, 58 ME. L. REV. 291 (2006);
Richard H. Pildes, Conflicts Between American and European Views of Law: The Dark Side of Legalism,
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 145 (2003).
17. Horatia Muir Watt, Propos liminaires sur le prestige du modèle américain, 45 ARCHIVES DE
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 29, 33-34 (2001).
18. Jouannet, supra note 16, at 297.
19. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 20109, 249-54 (1993).
20. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-94 (1996).
21. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE: THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1981).
22. See MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS: A
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, LAW AND THE MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D.
LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & JAMES
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one that “soon [contributed to] the defining tradition within which most American
postwar international law scholars began to operate.”23 It is still a greater problem to
ignore a doctrine that has been explicitly endorsed by the President of the International
Court of Justice, who once defined international law as “a process, a system of
authoritative decision-making. It is not just the neutral application of rules. . . . The
role of international law is to assist in the choice between . . . various alternatives
[arguably prescribed by existing rules]. International law is a process for resolving
problems.”24
Understanding the doctrinal importance of the NHSIL is nonetheless not an easy
task. Once deemed “seminal”25 and until recently considered to be of principal
importance in American doctrine, the NHSIL today boasts few explicitly faithful
adherents. Neither anecdotes26 nor internal critiques—often limited to the field of
public international law—have managed to explain or erase the paradox of this
influence, which, while once clearly major, seems to have fallen from favor today. In
order to understand the NHSIL’s impact on international law, it is necessary to
consider American legal philosophy more generally because the NHSIL’s current
status is in large part the result of dynamics created by the opposing forces that have
driven the evolution of American legal philosophy. In this Article, I endeavor to
explain why American legal philosophy should engage in a reconsideration of what
can be termed a European conception of public international law. To some degree, this
engagement is presently underway at Yale Law School.
I will begin with an internal analysis of McDougal’s legal thought in Part II, where
I will show that McDougal proposed a general, or “systematic,” jurisprudence that
might even be called a “general grammar of law.”27 In Part III, I will demonstrate that
McDougal’s international law writings are simply specific applications of his general
jurisprudence. It is important to remember McDougal not only as the international
lawyer (even if of a nationalist sort) that he was often seen to be, but also as a
theoretician whose project was to develop “a jurisprudence that takes systemic account
of all aspects of social reality relevant to the processes and structures of making

C. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967); MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & IVAN A. VLASIC, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE (1963);
TOWARDS WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MYRES S. MCDOUGAL 591-93 (W.
Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston eds., 1976).
23. Harold H. Koh, Why do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2620 (1997).
Although Dean Koh carefully mixes the theory of the NHSIL with those theories developed by Professors
Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas Lowenfeld, all of whom contributed to the work of the
International Legal Process School, it should be noted that the latter theories never attained the doctrinal
coherence of the NHSIL. See id. at 2617-24.
24. Id. at 2618 n.82 (alteration in original) (quoting ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 267
(1994)).
25. Richard A. Falk, Rosalyn C. Higgins, W. Michael Reisman & Burns H. Weston, Myres Smith
McDougal (1906-1998), 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 729, 733 (1998).
26. See, e.g., Remarks by Richard A. Falk, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy,
79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 266, 281 (1985) (delivering a harsh appraisal of McDougal’s “uncanny
capacity to apply [his jurisprudential method] in a manner that consistently accords with U.S. foreign
policy”).
27. Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, Theories About International
Law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 188, 261 (1968).
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rational decisions about legal policy alternatives.”28 It has too often been forgotten
that his theory encompasses the training of lawyers in domestic law, particularly the
law of property and constitutional law.29 Moreover, his theories draw on a vast variety
of sources, such as Whiteheadian contextualism, Freudian psychology, organizational
theory, and policy science. McDougal’s “‘policy-oriented’ approach to the study of
law” must therefore be understood and evaluated in the context of a “comprehensive
guiding theory.”30
Although it is perhaps surprising, it is helpful to compare McDougal’s approach
with the legal realism of Professor Karl Llewellyn, as I will do in Part IV. In the light
shed by this comparison, which serves as the key to understanding how McDougal’s
theory came to occupy a central place in American doctrine and also why it ultimately
did not survive, I will examine McDougal’s unique advancement of both formalist and
realist agendas. A clear focus on the formalist-realist dualism of the NHSIL will
permit us to rediscover a critical aspect of its genius. In Part V, I will argue that the
resolution of the legal issues arising from the international fight against terrorism
demonstrates that after decades of mutual ignorance, this formalist-realist dualism of
McDougal’s jurisprudence provides common ground for rapprochement between
European and American conceptions of international law.
II. THE NHSIL’S GENERAL THEORY OF LAW
“Most of what passes for realistic
jurisprudence is, of course, true.
But where do we go from there?”31

The NHSIL’s philosophy of law is a general theory that is driven by two principal
considerations: one critical (its post-realism) and the other prospective (its valuecentered normativism). The thorough-going realism of the NHSIL is usually taken for
granted32 insofar as McDougal considers that it is “not merely formulations de lege
ferenda . . . but even applications allegedly lax lata that require policy choices.”33 The
relegation of “formal authority without effective control” to “illusion” and not “law”
led McDougal to incorporate into his analysis, in a realistic manner, those who “look
behind [the] apparent decision-makers to [the] real decision-makers.”34

28. Richard A. Falk, International Legal Order: Alwyn V. Freeman vs. Myres S. McDougal, 59 AM. J.
INT’L L. 48, 70-71 (1965).
29. See, e.g., HAROLD D. LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY (1992); W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND
SHAPING LAW (1987).
30. McDougal, supra note 4, at 140.
31. Myres S. McDougal, speaking at the thirty-first annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools, held in Chicago, Illinois. 31 ASS’N AM. L. SCHS. PROC. 120 (1933).
32. Emmanuel Jouannet even refers to the NHSIL solely as a “realist tradition.” Jouannet, supra note
16, at 330.
33. McDougal, supra note 4, at 156.
34. Id. at 182. Compare McDougal’s understanding with Kelsen’s remarks on “validity” and
“efficiency” in HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 39, 118-19 (Anders Wedberg trans.,
Russell & Russell 1961) (1945).
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This realistic tenor is clearly paradoxical, as McDougal often criticized all former
realist jurisprudence.35 He was particularly severe with the Yale Realists36 for the
circuitous nature of their reasoning, and for leaving certain matters unresolved, including the context in which decisions are made, semantic limitations, and the essential
complementary nature of legal rules.37 Against the realists’ implicit idea that legal
decisions are made by courts, McDougal argued that “decision-making is a dynamic
process in which decision-makers are located in many different institutional positions
and contexts.”38 He sought to move beyond Jerome Frank’s tortured psychological explanation for the persistence of the positive myth.39 Nevertheless, these criticisms did
not prevent McDougal from incorporating the fundamental sociological insights of the
realists40: a critique of legal rules as simple “conventional justifications”41 that judges
were accustomed to making and refocusing attention from rules to decisions42 founded
on diverse social and personal stimuli.43 Instead of regarding the decision as illustrating
the rule, the NHSIL took the realist view—similar to that of the Law and Economics and
Critical Legal Studies movements44—that the rule was only one element in the analysis of
the decision.45 Michael Reisman expresses this view as follows:
American legal scholars [do not] seriously believe that a rule conception contributed
to understanding or effective operation in the international law, much less that rules
have magical properties that enable them to constrain naked power. . . . [The]
NHS[IL] has organized the reasons for its rejection of the rule approach to make
explicit where affirmative contributions were required. In most general terms, the
utility of this intellectual approach is that it permits the scholar and lawyer to see law
as a secular artifact created by human beings to achieve certain social consequences;
it legitimizes and facilitates the appraisal of the legal system in terms of goals and
makes explicit the social engineering function of the lawyer.46

35. See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
362 (1971).
36. For two attempts to synthesize the arguments against realism, see Hermann Kantorowicz, Some
Rationalism About Realism, 43 YALE L.J. 1240 (1934), and KRONMAN, supra note 19.
37. See Myres S. McDougal, Perspective for an International Law of Human Dignity, 53 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 107, 112 (1959).
38. McDougal, supra note 4, at 182-83.
39. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1963) (1930).
40. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 13-17.
41. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 240 (1943). See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment
Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in the Judicial Decision, 14 CORN. L.Q. 274, 278 (1929) (discussing
judicial approaches to decision-making).
42. See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 41, at 237; Myres S. McDougal, Preface to LASSWELL &
MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at xxii.
43. See FRANK, supra note 39, at 108-26.
44. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Intellectual Foundations of “Law and Economics”, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC.
184, 184 (1983) (noting that “law and economics evolved out of the agenda of legal realism”); Mark V.
Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies: Introduction, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239, 239 (1984)
(reasoning that a “sustained attack on formalism . . . makes critical legal studies the heir to legal realism”).
45. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 8-11; see also Myres S. McDougal, Fuller vs. The
American Legal Realists, 50 YALE L.J. 827 (1940).
46. Remarks by W. Michael Reisman, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, 79
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 266, 279 (1985).
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There are different types of realism.47 It was due precisely to the theoretical
framework of the Yale Realists of the 1930s that the NHSIL was able to ensure the
continuing influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes’s perspective,48 and sustain Wesley
Hohfeld’s transformative vision, which Professor Robert Gordon has characterized as
a call to shape “activist law reformers on the public stage.”49 The NHSIL’s first
initiatives date back to the moment when three corrosive movements had already
begun to pull apart the Langdellian synthesis between English analytical jurisprudence
and German historical jurisprudence.50 At Columbia, the functionalist development of
empirical methods had allowed for an analysis of rules with respect to their social
effects.51 At Yale, Deans Robert Hutchins and Charles Clark had begun the process
of recruiting the future theorists of Yale Realism.52 And finally, at Harvard, after the
promotion of sociological jurisprudence by Dean Roscoe Pound, empirical research
in areas like administrative law and public utilities law prospered under the direction
of Professors Bruce Wyman, Felix Frankfurter, and James Landis.53 Yet it was the
first New Haven School in the 1930s that succeeded in combining these three
heterogeneous developments, and it was thanks to this synthesis that McDougal then
embarked on his early research program.
Nevertheless, the realists of the 1930s could not craft “much more than
preliminary [solutions to] the affirmative problems of jurisprudence,”54 because at that
time legal science was limited to anticipating judges’ behavior.55 However, well
before Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan published their influential Power and
Society in 1950,56 McDougal was already seeking to develop “the conscious, deliberate
use of law as an instrument of policy.”57 It became essential for him to move “from
Legal Realism to Policy Sciences,”58 in order to “establish an observational standpoint,

47. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986);
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); WILFRID E. RUMBLE, JR.,
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1968); JOHN HENRY
SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW
SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1986); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
48. See, e.g., OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173
(1920) (famously defining “the law” as “prophecies of what the courts will do in fact”).
49. Robert W. Gordon, Professors and Policymakers: Yale Law School Faculty in the New Deal and
After, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 75, 83 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004) (discussing in general
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, A Vital School of Jurisprudence and Law: Have American Universities
Awakened to the Enlarged Opportunities and Responsibilities of the Present Day?, 14 ASS’N AM. L. SCHS.
PROC. 76 (1914)).
50. See generally id.; KALMAN, supra note 47, at 3-144.
51. See KALMAN, supra note 47, at 67-97.
52. See id. at 67-144; SCHLEGEL, supra note 47, at 81-146 (discussing the empirical approach of Charles
Clark and William Douglas).
53. See KALMAN, supra note 47, at 45-66.
54. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 15.
55. See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics, in JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 72 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1964).
56. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950).
57. Myres S. McDougal, Preface to LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at xxii.
58. Myres S. McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the
World Community, 56 YALE L.J. 1345, 1345 (1947).
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for both scholarly inquirers and decision makers, in identification with all the relevant
communities of humankind and to outline a framework of inquiry about law, a
jurisprudence, that would be more helpful than our inherited frames of jurisprudence
in clarifying and securing common interests.”59 McDougal took great care in
“formulating community or social process in terms of people, with varying
perspectives, in varying situations, employing base values, by practices (myth and
technique), to effect a redistribution among people of certain demanded or ‘scope’
values.”60 It is therefore this prescriptive dimension—far more than realism—that
lends the NHSIL’s theory its specificity. The NHSIL defines the stakes organically,
insofar as its definition of law, as the sum of total processes,61 was based on the
conjunction of common expectations concerning authority with a high degree of
corroboration in practice,62 thereby making the principle of legal certainty more
difficult to defend and common goals more difficult to define.
The innovative character of McDougal’s methodology63 derives from its
integration of the realist critique of formalism with its comprehensive and systematic
analysis of the entire social process.64 This led him to conceive legal decision-making
as a choice among eight values: power, or effective participation in the making of
important decisions; wealth, the control over economic assets; enlightenment, access
to the knowledge on which rational choice depends; skills, proficiency in the exercise
of talents; well-being, the enjoyment of physical and psychic health; affection,
enjoyment of congenial human relationships; respect, access to other values on the
basis of merit; and rectitude, the sharing of common standards of conduct.65 Every
legal decision-maker, McDougal tells us, prioritizes one of these values, and because
“power” tends to be the most common, McDougal devotes a major portion of his
theory to it.
McDougal’s conception of the “world social process” as “a series of interrelated
value processes”66 led McDougal to describe the legal process in terms of seven

59. Myres S. McDougal, Preface to LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at xxi.
60. McDougal, supra note 4, at 168.
61. See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1958). McDougal would add
to Hart and Sacks’s “notion of law as a process of decision . . . a more comprehensive conception of
processes of authoritative decision and the systematic relation of such processes to their context in social
and community processes.” LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 28 n.39. See also Myres S.
McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 NAT’L L.F. 53
(1956).
62. See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law: Maintaining
Observational Standpoint and Delimiting the Focus of Inquiry, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 23-50 (1976); LASSWELL
& MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 26.
63. See Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Trends in Theories About Law: Comprehensiveness
in Conceptions of Constitutive Process, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1972).
64. See MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 22, at 161-363.
65. McDougal, supra note 4, at 168. See also LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 336-388;
Myres S. McDougal, W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard, The World Community: A Planetary
Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807 (1988); Myres S. McDougal, The World Constitutive Process
of Authoritative Decision, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: TRENDS AND PATTERNS
73 (Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black eds., 1969).
66. McDougal, supra note 4, at 169.
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functions: the intelligence function, “[p]ractices by which decision-makers keep
themselves informed and clarify and project future plans of action”; the recommending
function, “[p]ractices by which initiative is taken and pressure exerted to secure
specific decisions”; the prescribing function, “[p]ractices by which policy is formally
enacted into authoritative community prescription”; the invoking function, “[p]ractices
by which community machinery is set in motion for the application of prescriptions in
concrete instances”; the applying function, “[p]ractices by which authoritatively
prescribed community policy is administered in concrete instances”; the appraising
function, “the detailed examination of the consequences of prescriptions and
applications”; and the terminating function, “[p]ractices by which obsolete
prescriptions are put to an end.”67 Finally, McDougal identified five “intellectual
tasks” for use by legal decision-makers,68 the performance of which would facilitate
the “implementation of a universal order of human dignity.”69
Admirable for its modernity, McDougal’s Copernican double revolution in
jurisprudence—both post-realist70 and normative71—allowed him to establish his
particular theory about the process of making social choices. This theory was unique
in a number of ways: its reformative force far surpassed that of the realists;72 it
incorporated a social anthropology73 in which agents maximize their individual
positions while at the same time remaining strongly influenced by the communities to
which they belong;74 and it described law as a process of decision that permits the
integration of policy considerations without reducing law to politics.75 But the
essential characteristic of the NHSIL is its often overlooked generality. Leaving
international law aside for the moment, it is impossible to conceive of a theory that is
applicable in a broader social context or is applied with a broader goal—the
furtherance of a public order of human dignity. It is in these respects that McDougal
departs from the jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen.

67. Id. at 177-78.
68. The five tasks include (1) clarification of goal, (2) description of trend, (3) analysis of conditioning
factors, (4) projection of future goals, and (5) invention and consideration of policy alternatives. Myres S.
McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, in
STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3, 16-17 (Myres S. McDougal ed., 1960).
69. Id. at 16.
70. See W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 108 YALE L.J. 935,
937 (1999) (describing the principal impact of McDougal’s jurisprudential revolution as “unseating rules
as the mechanism of decision and installing the human being—all human beings, to varying degrees—as
deciders”).
71. See Falk, Higgins, Reisman & Weston, supra note 25, at 731 (noting that McDougal “rejected any
natural or transempirical content to law and specifically postulated the goals of human dignity; he did not
attempt to discover or derive them”).
72. See Reisman, supra note 70, at 938.
73. See BENT ROSENTHAL, ÉTUDE DE L’OEUVRE DE MYRES SMITH MCDOUGAL EN MATIÈRE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 33-44 (1970).
74. For example, McDougal conceived of property not as “‘land’ but [as] the aggregate of a
community’s spatial resources,” and believed that the goal of law was the optimization “of the common
interests of the community.” Reisman, supra note 1, at 484.
75. See DUXBURY, supra note 2, at 171-72; Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, The Relation
of Law to Social Process: Trends in Theories About Law, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 465, 465-85 (1976).
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III. THE APPLICATION OF NHSIL JURISPRUDENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
Without attempting a critique of the NHSIL from the perspective of international
law,76 I will limit my presentation here to a demonstration of how the application of
McDougal’s jurisprudence to international law represents a specific application of his
systematic, general theory of law, focusing on its two principal tendencies: realism and
value-orientation. The application of McDougal’s jurisprudence to international law
is no less “revolutionary” than its application in other contexts.77
McDougal certainly would not have left the field of property law, where he began
his career, to devote himself to international law if he had not been living in the global
climate that followed the Second World War.78 McDougal explains that the existence
of new weapons of destruction, people’s new awareness of the world, and the urgent
need to institute a freer society that would be more respectful of human dignity all
played a role in his change of heart.79 Nevertheless, even if the war had reawakened
the world to the problems generated by the gap between the “myth system”80 and the
“operational code,”81 it had certainly not created them. Whereas work on systems of
coordination of formal authority and on effective political power had led many
theorists to reaffirm the realist critique of formalist positivism in the domestic legal
order, the idea that the international legal order was fundamentally different from the
domestic legal order prevented them from extrapolating their critical insights to the
international level.82 It is not unreasonable to think that McDougal’s interest in
international law resided in the fact that the international domain rendered traditional
theory even more obsolete and increased the NHSIL’s visibility exponentially.83 It is
with respect to international law that the NHSIL has made its greatest impact.
McDougal described with great care the perspectives and exigencies of the
participants in the international order, the situations in which they interact, the
fundamental values that govern their substantive choices, and the practices by which
they seek to exercise their influence.84 The adoption of the functional approach to the
analysis of the international order reveals the fundamental tension at that level between
a “constitutive process,” which is dynamic and reflects interactions that bind the

76. See generally ROSENTHAL, supra note 73.
77. See Michael Reisman, A Jurisprudence from the Perspective of the “Political Superior,” 23 N. KY.
L. REV. 605, 623 (1996) (discussing the democratic dimension of this revolution).
78. See Ellery C. Stowell, Commentary, The Juridical Significance of World War II, 38 AM. J. INT’L
L. 106 (1944) (arguing for the necessity of developing international law in the United States). McDougal’s
return to academic life was accompanied by the publication of Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties
and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy,
54 YALE L.J. 181 (1945), an article addressing the position of the United States with regard to international
organizations.
79. See McDougal, supra note 4, at 138-39.
80. See generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, FOLDED LIES: BRIBERY, CRUSADES, AND REFORMS 15-36
(1979).
81. But see K.N. Llewellyn, McDougal and Lasswell Plan for Legal Education, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 476
(1943) (refusing to join in McDougal’s sensitivity to the difference between these two concepts).
82. The seminal book by Mirjan R. Damaška, which built on Max Weber’s analytical tools and marked
a change in this trend, came out much later. See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986).
83. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 39-48 (discussing the trends in theories about law).
84. Id.
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participants together, and a static “public order,” which seeks to protect the
fundamental characteristics of that order, such as the process of law formation.85
Without belaboring this point, I want to indicate how these features result in three
principal differences between the NHSIL and classical internationalist analyses.
First, McDougal adopted a fully sociological approach86 to identifying the source
of the obligatory force of international law.87 This approach substantially comported
with the realists’ refusal to recognize any obligatory force of law independent of
individual decision-makers acting within particular contexts.88 Far from seeing
international law as “naked power or unlawful coercion,”89 McDougal’s approach
carves out an essential place for “communication” among the decision-makers of all
nations and their “target audience[s].”90 That legal subjects, who comprise any given
decision-maker’s target audience, have an understandable interest in an organized
social life explains why they have a corresponding right to expect decisions to be
implemented in practice.91 This pre-constructivist92 approach afforded McDougal the
opportunity to expose the means—more complex than those existing in the internal
legal order—by which decision-makers, who proceed according to “a disciplined and
contextual mode of analysis,”93 can promote cooperation in the service of human

85. Id. at 28-31.
86. See, e.g., MCDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 22, at 578-79 (“[T]he reasonableness, and hence
lawfulness . . . of states’ claims to . . . exclusive competence in contiguous [coastal] zones must . . . be
appraised [according to a disciplined multifactoral analysis that comprehends the] terms of the more general
policy underlying the whole public order of the oceans”).
87. See Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 62, at 23 (discussing the divergence of theories regarding
authority and control, and the resulting confusion over the interrelations of the two in the creation and
observance of legal norms); McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 27, at 194 (suggesting that
“mankind has not yet created the legal institutions, or processes of authoritative decision, adequate to clarify
and secure common interests under conditions of contemporary interdependence”).
88. As is evident from his writings on the International Court of Justice, W. Michael Reisman remains
an exponent of this view. See W. Michael Reisman, International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre
in the Study of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD
POLITICS 3, 15-17 (W. Michael Reisman & Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988) (arguing that international
incidents—“overt conflict[s] between two or more actors in the international system”—become the
“epistemic unit” of international law precisely because they are resolved by non-judicial processes).
89. McDougal, supra note 61, at 57. See also McDougal, supra note 4, at 157-60 (criticizing
Ambassador George F. Kennan and Professor Hans J. Morgenthau for both attacking a “‘legalisticmoralistic’ approach to foreign policy” and expounding what McDougal characterizes as a “pure theory of
power” in international law).
90. Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in World Constitutive
Process: How International Law is Made, 6 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 249, 250 (1980).
91. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 22, at 276-78 (“[T]he clarification of fundamental policy
and the explicit relating of specific alternatives in decision to the basic demands, expectations, and
identifications of peoples constitute . . . much the more effective way of organizing, channeling, and
harnessing their perspectives to the implementation of minimum order and . . . international law generally”).
92. See Anthony C. Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics, 38
VA. J. INT’L L. 107, 125-40 (1998), for an illuminating analysis of constructivist theory’s unique
conceptualization of the dynamic relationship between state actors and the socially constructed international
system.
93. McDougal, supra note 37, at 109.
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dignity by crafting decisions that are “both authoritative and controlling”94 and lead to
necessary and proportional action.
Second, McDougal’s analysis of the connection between national and international
law is also sociological. He recognized that “proponents of a policy-oriented theory
about law will seek an accurate empirical account of the reciprocal impact or interaction, in the distribution of inclusive and exclusive decisions and in consequences for
values, of the interpenetrating processes of national and transnational authority and
control.”95 This prompted him to stress the primordial attention to be given to the
individual96—both as a sociological reality and as a normative source—in order to
understand the interpretation of national and international processes.97 Thus, and this
is not the least forceful of his formulations, McDougal explained that the unity of
international law derives from two characteristics: formality—the existence of
effective authority and control despite the lack of a decreed institutional articulation;
and materiality—the capacity to promote human dignity.
Finally, because the NHSIL maintains that international relationships are
transformed by the desire of the people “to maximize their values,”98 it calls into
question the values that underlie both its own general analysis and those of
international law itself. This question is all the more urgent because “the trend toward
interaction throughout the world community will continue.”99 Judicial decisions are
complicated by a variety of valid demands, which are themselves a result of the
diversity of national communities. The NHSIL foregrounds the prescriptive role of
jurists working at the international level for three reasons100: first, members of national
elites traditionally have struggled to find common symbols of authority; second, judges
have great difficulty finding effective sanctions to maintain social order; finally,
doctrine has the difficult task of conceiving intellectual tools that are adapted to life
in the international community.101 The jurist, far from being able to confine himself
to a technical role, must instead clarify the common interests of the participants.102
Although the jurisprudence of the NHSIL introduces potential problems resulting from
its particular emphasis on values, it also sets limits. Even though the jurist is charged
with advancing the interests and values of a particular state, he must—because the
NHSIL stipulates that he can103—promote the “common interest,” understood as

94. McDougal, supra note 61, at 58.
95. LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 32.
96. See generally H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950).
97. See Myres S. McDougal, Some Basic Theoretical Concepts About International Law: A PolicyOriented Framework of Inquiry, 4 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 337, 352 (1960); ROSENTHAL, supra note 73, at 99101.
98. MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 22, at 148.
99. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME: A FRAMEWORK FOR BASIC POLICY
RESEARCH 29 (1951).
100. See Lung-chu Chen, In Affectionate Memory of Professor Myres McDougal: Champion for an
International Law of Human Dignity, 108 YALE L.J. 953 (1999) (discussing the NHSIL’s approach to the
protection of human rights).
101. See MCDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 22, at 278-79.
102. But see Remarks by Oscar Schachter, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy,
79 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 266, 266-73 (1985) (taking issue with this proposition).
103. According to McDougal, Lasswell, and Vlasic, “interests compatible with human dignity are
common; interests incompatible with this criterion are special.” MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra
note 22, at 148.
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maximum order, the greatest production of values,104 and minimum order, cooperation
and peacekeeping.105
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF LANGDELL AND LLEWELLYN
The preceding reformulation of the NHSIL as a general theory of law allows us
to perceive the implicit paradox evoked by Yale Law School Dean Harold Koh, who
notes that “the New Haven School’s overriding focus on value-orientation came to
trouble even those who sympathized with its methodological ambitions.”106 The
interpretation defended here would suggest that values are indeed essential to the
NHSIL. How then can one explain this disaffection for the NHSIL? I argue that this
disaffection can be accounted for neither by the obsolescence of NHSIL jurisprudence,
nor by the explicit nationalist formulation of values defended by McDougal, but rather
by looking at recent developments in American legal theory. I will attempt to
demonstrate this by reference to the taxonomy of contemporary American legal
theories recently articulated and explored by Judge Guido Calabresi: legal formalism,
“law and . . . ,” “legal process,” and “law and status.”107
I have already stressed the NHSIL’s opposition to legal formalism.108 However
influential legal formalism may have been in the development of the Kelsenian
normative approach to jurisprudence, legal formalism lay fallow for most of the
twentieth century, only recently to reemerge, especially in the United States, in the
fields of contract law, constitutional interpretation, legislation, and even international
law.109 Although it may be hasty to conclude that the NHSIL’s opposition to formalism is complete and true, it can be said fairly that the NHSIL maintained close
affinities with the three other principal trends in American legal thought. For example,
the NHSIL naturally followed the “functionalist” approach, characterized as “Law and
. . .” by Judge Calabresi, which considers the law to be neither independent nor

104. See Reisman, supra note 46, at 273-80 (1985).
105. MCDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASIC, supra note 22, at 227.
106. Koh, supra note 23, at 2622-23.
107. See Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law and to the
Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2113 (2003).
108. Formalism, like any doctrine, has not remained static, but instead has experienced substantial
transformation over time. For ideas on the evolution of legal doctrines see Otto Pfersmann, Université Paris
I, The Path of Legal Change and the Doctrinal Paradox (Nov. 16, 2006) (paper presented at the Legal
Theory Workshop of Yale Law School) (on file with author). See generally Neil MacCormick,
Contemporary Legal Philosophy: The Rediscovery of Practical Reason, 10 J.L. & SOC’Y 1 (1983)
(suggesting that legal philosophy scholars should, in the future, reflect on the mechanics of the fact-finding
process and focus their research on “practical reason”); Robert S. Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 861 (1966) (discussing the history and various branches of jurisprudence, and speculating
as to the future of a “new analytical jurisprudence”).
109. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity and Authority, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 549 (1993); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L.
REV. 869 (2002); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). Indeed, Judge Calabresi
suggests that even Robert Unger of the Critical Legal Studies movement has in essence “appealed for a
return to a doctrinalism of the most formalistic sort” by “advocating an approach called ‘deviationist’ or
‘expanded’ doctrine.” Calabresi, supra note 107, at 2130 & n.71 (citing ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER,
THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 15-22, 88-90 (1986)).
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autonomous, but rather amenable to illumination by other fields of study.110 Even
though the NHSIL elevated sociology to a favored position,111 other disciplines,
including history, philosophy, psychology, psychoanalysis,112 and economics,113 have
routinely been brought to bear by proponents of the various iterations of the “Law
and . . .” approach.114 This willingness to enrich legal analysis by reference to other
disciplines differentiated the NHSIL from realist theorists like Professor Arthur
Corbin, who predicted failure for “those who hope to find answers [to legal problems]
in the social sciences.”115
Furthermore, the NHSIL was greatly, albeit implicitly, nourished by the Legal
Process School, which, after its first efflorescence at Harvard116 and its expansion at
Yale under the influence of Alexander Bickel and John Hart Ely, is currently
undergoing a second renaissance in the form of the New Legal Process School. The
NHSIL’s methodological proximity to this comparative institutional approach is the
outcome of a common concern for transforming the law by selecting the institution
most likely to define the norm and to determine the values that orient the legal system.
Finally, the NHSIL is not without certain similarities to the fourth and final movement
identified by Judge Calabresi as Law and Status, a critical analysis of the way in which
the judicial system affects certain categories of people.117 With the exception of his
early studies of property law, McDougal used this approach in an implicit and
normative way to optimize recourse to appropriate institutions, thereby promoting
human dignity.

110. Calabresi, supra note 107, at 2119-20 (noting that advocates of the “Law and . . .” approach seek
a “greater role for scholars, and frequently for courts as well, in the criticism and reform of law”).
111. See LASSWELL & MCDOUGAL, supra note 29, at 11 (“The various emphases subsumed under
‘sociological jurisprudence’ and ‘the sociology of law,’ . . . have had the common aspiration to bring inquiry
about law, as well as law itself, into a more realistic relation to the facts of social process.” (citing Roscoe
Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911))).
112. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN & ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY,
AND LAW 3-420 (1967) (attempting to find a definition “of [Freudian] psychoanalysis for law purposes”
through juxtaposed analysis of psychoanalytic and legal materials).
113. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1973); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089 (1972).
114. For an outline of a non-vocational legal education focused on applications of “scientific methods
to the study of law,” see Walter W. Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 303 (1927).
115. Calabresi, supra note 107, at 2121 (citing Arthur Corbin, Retirement Talk Delivered to the Faculty
of the Yale Law School (1942)). But cf. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821 (1935) (sympathizing with Holmes, Cook, Oliphant, Moore, Frank,
and Llewellyn, among others, in their “disrespect for . . . legal magic and word-jugglery”—practices that
amount to a jurisprudence of “transcendental nonsense”—and describing a “functional” solution as a project
of “eliminating supernatural terms” from the legal vocabulary, an effort similar to that which physicists and
mathematicians have undertaken in their respective fields).
116. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to HART
& SACKS, supra note 61, at cxxv-cxxxiv.
117. Calabresi, supra note 107, at 2127-29 (gathering and analyzing works of the Law and Organized
Labor movement in the 1930s, the Race and Law movement before and after Brown v. Board of Education,
and studies on sexual orientations following the Gender Studies and the Feminist Jurisprudence
movements).
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These affinities and external dynamics help to explain how the NHSIL was able
to evolve so easily within the field of American legal theory. Both share the same
major concerns. It goes without saying, however, that the affinities with the four major
movements identified by Judge Calabresi are diverse and uneven. For example, the
NHSIL’s use of the analyses provided by the Law and Status and the Legal Process
movements is limited. Recent developments in the Legal Process movement, however, have enlarged the number of institutions studied, and have considered the
contributions of institutions and judges to the protection of societal values.118 This
evolution has given rise to the New Legal Process School, which seems to have more
in common with the NHSIL than did the original Legal Process School. Yet the
acknowledgment of these affinities does not in and of itself explain how the NHSIL
was able to evolve at the nexus of the formalist and the “Law and . . . “ trends, an
apparently paradoxical nexus that may be explained by the observation that the
realists’ rejection of Langdellian formalism was only partial. In the strict sense, the
NHSIL is a post-Langdellian post-realism. It is here that the explanation for its
development appears to be located.
First of all, Langdell draws on both logic and experience and provides a theory of
law that is both descriptive and normative.119 Although he maintained that judicial
decisions were the heart of the science of law, his theory is geometrical—“antiAristotelian,” according to Dean Anthony Kronman120—in the sense that he promotes
the idea that the law evolves according to a logic inherent in the common law, which
holds that conflicts resolve themselves naturally. This Darwinian idea was strongly
influenced by the codification movement begun by Jeremy Bentham and John
Austin.121 The principles of the common law, which Langdell believed could only be
illuminated by inference as opposed to logical derivation,122 are organized into a
system of rules that have normative value.123 Refusing to accept the central hypothesis
of the common law according to which the law contains more than the typical
rationalizations for decisions, Langdell would continue to disapprove of decisions he
believed to be pathological. He substituted an historical and inherent logical
development for a logic based on praetorian decision, with reliance on a variety of

118. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation
as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991).
119. See KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 170-74; Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1, 1-11 (1983) (discussing Langdell’s seminal 1880 work, entitled Summary of the Law of Contracts,
and Oliver Wendell Holmes’s views thereon).
120. KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 174-80 (tracing the evolution of the idea of a geometry of law from
Aristotle to John Austin and Jeremy Bentham through Thomas Hobbes’s canonical Leviathan and A
Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England); see also Jeffrey Barnouw,
Prudence et science chez Hobbes, in THOMAS HOBBES: PHILOSOPHIE PREMIÈRE, THÉORIE DE LA SCIENCE ET
POLITIQUE 107 (Yves Charles Zarka & Jean Bernhardt eds., 1990); Paulette Carrive, La conception de la
loi chez Hobbes, Bacon et Selden, in THOMAS HOBBES: PHILOSOPHIE PREMIÈRE, THÉORIE DE LA SCIENCE ET
POLITIQUE 305 (Yves Charles Zarka & Jean Bernhardt eds., 1990).
121. See KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 180-81.
122. See generally ADOLF REINACH, ZUR PHÄNOMENOLOGIE DES RECHTS (1953); Julien Cantegreil,
D’une voie phénoménologique en théorie du droit. Remarques sur le réalisme d’Adolf Reinach, in LES
ETUDES PHILOSOPHIQUES 99, 99-112 (2005).
123. See generally John Langbein, Blackstone, Litchfield, and Yale: The Founding of Yale Law School,
in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL: THE TERCENTENNIAL LECTURES (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004).
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external factors.124 It is this that allows the judge to derive the “right answer” in
different judicial situations.
Karl Llewellyn provides two reasons that together form the missing link in the
chain—a link systematically ignored by the formalists and the various strands of the
“Law and . . . “ movement. Following Jerome Frank, Llewellyn proposed to limit law
to decisions made and to exclude the rules intended to govern those decisions.125
Llewellyn’s proposed limitation on the concept of law was an immensely productive
refutation of Langdell’s central idea of a “geometry of law,” which assumed law’s
conformity to rules,126 and which accordingly prevented Langdell from ever fully
articulating what the law should be. All that Langdell’s geometry afforded was a
system against which the correctness of any judicial decision could be measured.
Llewellyn’s opposing conviction—that the “sphere of individual ideals and
subjectivity”127 does not allow for consideration of normative questions with a
sufficient degree of scientific rigor—prompted a return to the realist view that no
descriptive science of law can mandate how judges should decide cases. Unlike
Langdell, Llewellyn distinguishes what the law “is” from what the law “ought” to
be.128 Moreover, unlike the realists, particularly Jerome Frank, Llewellyn does not
consider decisions to be purely idiosyncratic, as his empirical studies convinced him
that identical situations lead to identical results. Yet it seemed to him that legal
science, which had become a science of observation,129 must take into account
knowledge acquired as a result of such contemporary studies. This post-realism,
which led him to formulate laws of behavior comparable in rigor to the laws of
economics, brought him to embrace the original Langdellian desire for a true science
of law. In other words, by accepting Jerome Frank’s realist principles, Llewellyn
joined in the spirit of Langdell’s theoretical program, divested of its normative focus.
The 1930s realists shared Llewellyn’s conviction that the definition of law should
be limited to decisions. Although Jerome Frank maintained that the decisions of
judges did not satisfy the two prerequisites of geometry—independence and determinacy130—he continued to hope, along with Llewellyn and the first group of realists,
to “increase the ‘actual legal certainty’ of the adjudicative process as a whole.”131
We are now able to understand how the two alternative paths of the New Haven
School of the 1930s could suggest a way of moving beyond Langdellian geometry.
The two post-realist trends—the NHSIL and the Law and Economics School—would
thus re-appropriate the Langdellian project and distinguish themselves from Llewellyn

124. See KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 181.
125. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—the Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 439-43,
464 (1930); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222 (1931).
126. See KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 196-97.
127. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method—A Realist’s Critique, in
JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 77, 86 (1962).
128. KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 197.
129. LLEWELLYN, supra note 127, at 85-86.
130. KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 189-93.
131. Id. at 193-94 (quoting FRANK, supra note 39, at 171).
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by developing both prescriptive and descriptive agendas.132 To paraphrase Dean
Kronman, the great unifying feature of “Law and . . . ,” the NHSIL, and even Critical
Legal Studies,133 can thus be described as “anti-prudentialist” or “anti-Llewellian.”134
All of these schools of thought posit that, along with the tenets of formalism, a
normative science makes sense.135 In their seminal 1943 article entitled Legal
Education and Public Policy, McDougal and Lasswell refuse to base legal training
solely on “legal technicality” that would limit the law to a “closed, automatic, [and]
syntactical system.”136 In their article they called for the study of law to be re-centered
on “values” so as to provide rigorous guides for descriptive research.137 The training
that they defined was conceived to allow future lawyers to gain insight into the
international legal order in a disciplined manner, rather than calling on past judgments
as prescribed by the tenets of the common law.138 At the same time that it rejected the
naïve Langdellian equation of law and geometry and the practical confusion that such
an equation engendered between “is” and “ought,” the NHSIL maintained—in a very
Langdellian fashion—an ideal of legal science as a policy-oriented framework.139
Rejecting the traditional science of law for its inability to ground itself on decisions
alone, the NHSIL also rejected the New Haven School’s doctrine, and Jerome Frank’s
theories in particular, because of their inability to treat decisions scientifically.
McDougal and Lasswell’s uniqueness came from their interest in the structural
evolution of the law and in structural processes, leading to their rejection of Langdell’s
geometry. Rather than reduce judgments to analysis, they would underscore the
importance of choices among contested alternatives based on external factors.
The major unifying factor of the Law and Economics School and the NHSIL is
found in their common belief that a science of law should be capable of determining
with a high degree of accuracy both what the law is and what it ought to be.140 These

132. Because “Llewellynism” is today a doctrine without disciples, the contours of this doctrine will not
be described here; for a thorough explanation of Llewellyn’s approach, see KRONMAN, supra note 19, at
214-25.
133. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 82-92 (1997).
134. See KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 169, 201 (noting that the realists’ argument for the establishment
of a “normative legal science” was part of their overall goal of “ restor[ing] the dimension of legal science
that Llewellyn had eliminated”).
135. See Calabresi, supra note 107, at 2115 n.4; KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 168 (emphasizing that the
“scientific branch of realism” is an alliance between Law and Economics and Critical Legal Studies).
136. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 41, at 234-35.
137. Id. at 206.
138. See id. at 266. Arguably, because McDougal and Lasswell implicitly characterize Langdell’s
“values” as “legal concepts of high level abstraction,” id. at 232, it is impossible for them to develop a
normative political science on Langdell’s foundation. However, the creation of a “general political science,”
id. at 275 n.100, always appeared possible because given a fairly limited number of ultimate values it is
logically possible to make arguments both for and against values. Having accepted this premise, McDougal
and Lasswell argue that it is possible for an American student to find legitimate reasons to accept the values
of individualism and that it is therefore possible to construct a system for the application of these values.
Id. at 212-13.
139. Id. at 265.
140. While this is clear for Law and Economics, it is less so for Critical Legal Studies, even though the
latter, like the realists, refused a simple logic of law. See KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 167-68. Kronman
noted that “[c]ritical legal studies thus has a more ambivalent relationship to prudentialism than does law
and economics.” Id. at 241. See also ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE
(1990).
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two doctrines embrace the general project of constructing a systematic theory enriched
by their anti-prudentialist conception of “is” and “ought,” and by their confidence in
the rationality of the social sciences.141 This fascinating and unexplored theoretical
proximity explains the ease with which the NHSIL, not necessarily on the basis of its
own insights, was able to win adherents. But while recourse to the social sciences took
place according to a sociological model in McDougal’s writings, for other authors who
would form the dominant trend, such as Guido Calabresi, recourse was to an economic
model.142 The economic paradigm, which is even more anti-prudentialist, sought to
resolve the questions concerning the normative significance of the principle of
efficiency through the most abstract of arguments. It is this theoretical divergence that
explains the progressive isolation experienced by the NHSIL, in spite of its proximity
to other social-science-based theories. In other words, it is the “process methodology”
—and not the NHSIL’s “social ends or policy values”—that explains the paradox of
this essential but often neglected school.143
The NHSIL’s detractors often emphasized McDougal’s nationalist political
convictions or certain anecdotes, but it is clear that the stakes of the NHSIL’s
theoretical program were far more complex and were indissolubly linked with
American legal theory.144 It is therefore rather surprising that the NHSIL could benefit
from what has been called “French doctrine.” In the final part of this Article, I argue
that it is urgent to realize the full potential of this beneficial alliance in the context of
the American legal system’s response to international terrorism.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE NHSIL
“[T]he necessary conditions for the development
of legal technique are still lacking.”145

141. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42-48, 57-60 (1977) (demonstrating that this
general project is Langdellian thinking in its purest form); KRONMAN, supra note 19, at 176-77 (describing
prudentialism as an Aristotlean trait of character akin to practical wisdom, and Hobbesian anti-prudentialism
as the substitution of abstract thought for empirically-based understanding).
142. In other words, economist Kenneth Arrow’s scholarship would eventually appear more compelling
to American legal theorists than Parsons’s original sociological analysis.
143. Koh, supra note 23, at 2620.
144. Id. at 2620-21; see also supra note 26.
145. KELSEN, Technique, supra note 3, at 261 (translation by the author). The following quotation from
Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law makes plain the incompatibility of McDougal’s belief—that policy science
should influence legal theory—with Kelsen’s, namely that jurisprudence should remain uncontaminated by
such non-legal considerations:
[The] exclusive purpose [of the Pure Theory of Law] is to know and to describe its
object. The theory attempts to answer the question what and how the law is, not how it
ought to be. It is a science of law (jurisprudence), not legal politics.
It is called a “pure” theory of law, because it only describes the law and attempts to
eliminate from the object of this description everything that is not strictly law: Its aim is to
free the science of law from alien elements. This is the methodological basis of the theory.
HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 1 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of California Press 1967) (1934); see
also MICHEL TROPER, VÉRONIQUE CHAMPEIL-DESPLATS & CHRISTOPHE GRZEGORCZYK, THÉORIE DES
CONTRAINTES JURIDIQUES (2005).
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As far as legal theory is concerned, the NHSIL and “French doctrine” represent
opposite ends of the legal spectrum. Just as the analysis of American legal theory
cannot be understood without reference to Langdell, the French perspective requires
an understanding of the ideas of the generation of French civil law experts who came
into their own around 1900.146 In spite of the differences in the details of their theories,
the major theoreticians of that time—Raymond Saleilles, François Gény, Marcel
Planiol, Adhémar Esmein, and Édouard Lambert—were united in elevating the
importance of the judge and limiting his freedom in the realm of subjective
interpretation. In their view, the traditional deductive approach based on a variety of
legal techniques must give way to an inductive approach in which the meaning of the
law is derived from observing the law and judicial decisions, a thesis that Langdell had
maintained before them. These theoreticians’ interest in enhancing the role of the
judge and in the relationship between judicial decisions and legal doctrine led them
ultimately to stress the importance, not of the “jurist” in the broad McDougalian sense,
but of “la doctrine” in the sense coined by Philippe Jestaz and Christophe Jamin.147
The major French theoreticians of that time considered the appropriate source of “la
doctrine” as the sole authority able to express the principles emerging from a careful
study of the law and to organize them into a general theory.148 Whereas in the United
States the emergence of Yale Realism ended any idea that the law could be reduced
to a few readily-systematized principles, prominent proponents of “French doctrine”
would systematically exclude all critical and pluri-disciplinary developments from
their research, such as those that defined the evolution of American jurisprudence in
the twentieth century and in which the NHSIL had participated.149

146. See generally PHILIPPE JESTAZ & CHRISTOPHE JAMIN, LA DOCTRINE (2004) (framing the historical
construction of a French doctrine); Christophe Jamin, La construction de la pensée juridique française:
interrogations sur un modèle original à l’aune de son anti-modèle, in L’ARCHITECTURE DU DROIT 501
(Michel Troper et al. eds., 2006). But see Gérard Timsit, Éléments pour une theorie des cas extrêmes, in
POUR UNE THÉORIE DES “CAS EXTRÊMES” 11 (Julien Cantegreil ed., 2006); Gérard Timsit, Sur
l’engendrement du droit, 1988 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 39 (championing a deliberately less unified
understanding of French legal doctrine).
147. JESTAZ & JAMIN, supra note 146 (advancing an understanding of “la doctrine” that is amenable to
elaboration by professors, the members of the Council of State for domestic public law, and the international
judge for public international law).
148. The continuation of this trend with regard to compliance with international law is exemplified by
Elisabeth Zoller, who notes that “the absence of a theory of remedies makes the unilateral application of
international law unjustifiably suspect.” ELISABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
U.S. LEGISLATION 1 (1985).
149. Philippe Jestaz and Christophe Jamin have demonstrated this masterfully in civil law, but it is
equally valid in domestic public law and international public law. See JESTAZ & JAMIN, supra note 146, at
147-57. In the words of Jean-Pierre Cot,
[u]nfortunately, to my knowledge, the dialogue never took place. I have the impression that
our community of international lawyers, by its utter indifference to the ideas of [Raymond]
Aron, passed up a good opportunity to open the dialogue . . . . But at that time, ‘pragmatic
positivism’ objected with a non possumus which it considered decisive in any debate
between jurists and realists. The jurists simply were not interested.
Jean-Pierre Cot, Tableau de la pensee juridique americaine, 90 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT’L PUB. 537,
553 (2006) (translation by the author).
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Although the need to go beyond the traditional beaten paths of legal theory is
becoming increasingly evident in France,150 the NHSIL’s rule-skepticism and the
resulting “negation of international law as a set of obligatory norms” suggest that the
NHSIL needs to return partially to what we might call a European way of looking at
law.151 Let me be clear: with the McDougalian revolution now in vigor in the
American mainstream, the NHSIL alone can no longer claim that “[f]or policy sciences
jurisprudence, ‘law’ is the process through which members of a community seek to
clarify and secure their common interest.”152 Since the critical, demystifying work of
the NHSIL is deeply entrenched, the NHSIL must now better utilize the “myth of
rules” and better articulate and reinforce the relationship between law and rules.153 On
the one hand, it would be dangerous to state, imprecisely, that “[an entity subject to the
law] cannot assert as a matter of law that its own political interest is a sufficient ground
to deny the application of an accepted rule of law.”154 Even if the idea of law as a body
of obligatory rules is a myth, as Michael Reisman has brilliantly demonstrated,155 the
lawyer, and to a certain degree the judge, must function with this myth. Thus, it is a
myth that must be constructed from within in order to reinforce the common goal of
human dignity. One of the most significant strengths of the NHSIL is its ability to
denounce the mythical nature of the rules in international law, while at the same time
promoting an effective use of this very same myth. This would appear, in any case,
to be the ideal program for what would become the New New Haven School of
International Law, as I will now explain in the context of an analysis of the United
States’ legal response to terrorism.
From a European perspective, the United States doctrine on counterterrorism is
striking in its parochialism, which is certainly a consequence of its high degree of
technicality. Up to now, United States doctrine has concentrated mainly on the new
criminal procedures introduced into American law after 2001.156 As Dean Koh has
pointed out, the United States’ research agenda has been focused in three areas.157
First, the promotion of a “constitutional theory of unfettered executive power, based
on extraordinarily broad interpretations of both the Article II Commander in Chief
Clause and the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export

150. See generally JESTAZ & JAMIN, supra note 146 (insisting on legislative inflation, increasing
importance of supra-state jurisdictions, jurisprudential development of constitutional law, and new issues
of laws).
151. See Cot, supra note 149, at 554.
152. Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human Rights Abuses
in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, in THE METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL POLICY, 47, 51 (Steven R. Ratner & Anne-Marie Slaughter eds.,
2004).
153. In his seminars, Professor Michael Reisman mixes the highly policy-oriented approach of the
NHSIL with an extremely precise black-letter law reading of texts and court decisions. Such an approach
demonstrates one of the great strengths of the NHSIL—its ability to evaluate the myth system while playing
games with it at the same time.
154. Schachter, supra note 102, at 272.
155. See REISMAN, supra note 80, at 15-36.
156. See generally John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 765 (2005).
157. See Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2354-56 (2006).
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Corp.” 158 Second, the current tendency of the executive to “infringe on civil liberties
without any clear legislative statements” authorizing such action.159 This problem
could range from the National Security Agency’s secret surveillance program to the
indefinite detention and torture of foreign detainees.160 Third, the increasing
distinction between citizens and aliens, notably Muslim aliens, within American
society.161
Because courts have adjudicated some claims arising from the effects of these
trends in recent constitutional litigation,162 American academic debates have focused
on manifest “errors” in these decisions. Among the “errors” that have been most
thoroughly scrutinized are the United States Supreme Court’s use of the Mathews v.
Eldridge163 balancing test in Hamdi and other courts’ use of a proportionality test in
similar cases,164 and general judicial deference to executive decisions in foreign
affairs.165 To their credit, American academics have sometimes underlined the
paradoxical effects of these instances of judicially policed, competency-sensitive
cooperation between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government
in areas of the law unrelated to terrorism.166 These debates have also raised normative

158. Id. at 2355. Compare Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (confirming this theory) with
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). See, e.g.,
Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. and Robert J. Delahunty, Special
Counsel to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002); Memorandum from Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen. to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes
II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen.
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 93-96 (1990).
159. Koh, supra note 157, at 2355.
160. See Norman Abrams, Developments in US Anti-Terrorism Law: Checks and Balances Undermined,
4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1117 (2006) (summarizing recent developments).
161. Koh, supra note 157, at 2355-56.
162. For three occasions on which the United States Supreme Court has ruled on the merits of assertions
of unilateral executive power and imposed significant limits thereon, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
163. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
164. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529 (“[T]he process due in any given instance is determined by weighing
‘the private interest that will be affected by the official action’ against the Government’s asserted interest,
‘including the function involved’ and the burdens the Government would face in providing greater process.”
(quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976))); Owen Fiss, The War Against Terrorism and the
Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 241-45 (2006); Michel Rosenfeld, Judicial Balancing in
Times of Stress: Comparing the American, British, and Israeli Approaches to the War on Terror, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2079, 2079 n.2 (2006) (observing that “the American and British ‘balancing’ approach
and the Israeli and British ‘proportionality’ analysis are not completely equivalent, but they largely
overlap”).
165. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting that the judiciary must
be careful not to “threaten our ‘customary policy of deference to the President in matters of foreign affairs’”
(quoting Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 348 (2005))); see also Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional
Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 5-6 (2004) (questioning
whether the American judiciary’s preference for “process-based approaches” to resolution of constitutional
claims in times of crisis bespeaks role abdication or practical accommodation).
166. Jeffrey Segal et al., The Effect of War on the Supreme Court 1, 16-18 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Hauser Global Law Sch. Program, Global Law Working Paper No. 03/04, 2004), available at http://
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questions, such as how the United States should adapt to this so-called “deference”:
Should this judicial posture in any given case be accepted because its impact on future
adjudications is likely to be minimal?167 Or, in contrast, should the conditions under
which the judiciary is required to defer to certain executive or legislative actions
during short-term emergencies be somehow prescribed by an “emergency
constitution,” a discrete framework meant to produce predictable results in similar
cases?168 The stakes in the American “War on Terror” are undoubtedly high and
complex enough to cause American academics to focus almost exclusively on the
American aspect of international counterterrorism.
Michael Reisman’s work on the war on terror illustrates the comparative
theoretical strength of the NHSIL to illuminate the United States’ approach by bringing
back into the equation a truly global perspective.169 Reisman explains: “international
law affects the shaping of government responses to international terrorism by
prescribing generally or particularly the contingencies, procedures, and scope of
response—be it unilateral or multilateral—lawfully available to a target; and second
. . . exploring the reasons for the rather spotty record of achievement.”170 Reisman
takes into account governments, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and the media.171 According to him, these are “all the actors who
participate in assessing, retrospectively or prospectively, the lawfulness of
international actions and whose consequent reactions constitute, in sum, the
international decision.”172 By taking all of these actors into account, he is able to
evaluate and elaborate the appropriate responses by targets, “not simply in terms of
certain rules that are supposed to form part of a black-letter code of international law,
but in terms of the acceptability of those responses, in different contexts, to the
contemporary international decision process.”173 More than any other judge-centered
approach or United States-centered analysis, this McDouglian approach is essential
when one is “engaged in an ongoing process of inventing futures and developing
capacities for ‘proacting’ or ‘prosponding’ to them, rather than ‘reacting’ or

www.nyulawglobal.org/workingpapers/detail/documents/GLWP0304Segal.pdf (discussing the Court’s
role in allocating war powers among the elected branches).
167. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu? Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME 124, 136 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (“Judges should refrain from giving in to
an understandable urge to make exercises of emergency powers compatible with constitutional norms . . .
to avoid normalizing the exception.”).
168. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 77-121 (2006).
169. The United States could easily mix with the traditional French interest for traditional International
Public Law, on issues such as the crucial question of responsibility for private terrorist action. Compare
Michael Reisman, International Legal Response to Terrorism, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 3, 56-57 (1999), with
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, State Sponsors of Terrorism: Issues of International Responsibility, in ENFORCING
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 3, 3-16 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004), and TAL BECKER,
TERRORISM AND THE STATE 332 (2005) (outlining an interesting causal model to State responsibility for
private acts).
170. Reisman, supra note 169, at 5.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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‘responding’ to a series of actual presents.”174 Although historical factors explain both
the unique status of the NHSIL in American legal theory and its difference from
twentieth-century French jurisprudence, it appears that the NHSIL approach on the
terrorism question would benefit from further reflection, as is presently under way at
Yale and in Europe.
First, the issue of compliance with international law is at the heart of the NHSIL’s
traditional concern for promoting a law of human dignity.175 The NHSIL relies on an
extension of classical theories of international relations,176 notably power, coercion,
interest,177 liberalism,178 and constructivism.179 By giving new life to classic works
from the Legal Process and Transnational Legal Process Schools180—defined as both
theory and practice with respect to how public and private actors interact in a variety
of forums, such as public and private,181 and domestic and international182—jurists
would have a better framework for analysis and action with respect to the enforcement
of human rights in domestic law, a condition sine qua non for the realization of the
common goal of human dignity.183 The work done at the Yale Law School that
combines doctrines, an approach to coercive action, and a “blueprint” for political
action by decision-makers allows for a more accurate picture of how a complex play

174. Id. at 13. See also Michael Reisman, New Scenarios of Threats to International Peace and Security:
Developing Legal Capacities for Adequate Responses, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT: NEW SCENARIOS—NEW LAW? 13, 13-38 (Jost Delbrück ed., 1993).
175. See INTERNATIONAL INCIDENTS: THE LAW THAT COUNTS IN WORLD POLITICS (W. Michael Reisman
& Andrew R. Willard eds., 1988); ZOLLER, supra note 148; Harold H. Koh, Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (2003); Harold H. Koh, The Value of Process, 11 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 27
(2005).
176. See Moshe Hirsh, Compliance with International Norms in the Age of Globalization: Two
Theoretical Perspectives, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION:
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 166 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds., 2004); Kenneth W. Abbott,
Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 335
(1989); Arend, supra note 92, at 125-40; Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal
States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503 (1995).
177. See Abbott, supra note 176; Kenneth Abbott, The Trading Nation’s Dilemma: The Functions of the
Law of International Trade, 26 HARV. INT’L L.J. 501 (1985); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of
Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998).
178. See Slaughter, supra note 176.
179. See Arend, supra note 92.
180. See FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold Hongju
Koh eds., 2005); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935
(2002); Koh, supra note 23; Harold Hongju Koh, Internalization Through Socialization, 54 DUKE L.J. 975
(2004) (discussing the continued exploration of a “sociological model of sovereignty” undertaken in Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003)).
181. See Monica Hakimi, The Media as Participants in the International Legal Process, 16 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2006) (presenting a McDougalian perspective on the role of media); Koh, supra note
175, at 647 (discussing transnational norm entrepreneurs); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) (discussing normative entrepreneurs).
182. See generally Koh, supra note 20.
183. See Harold Hongju Koh, The “Haiti Paradigm” in United States Human Rights Policy, 103 YALE
L.J. 2391 (1994) (presenting a canonical example of the Transnational Legal Process); Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347 (1991); Koh, supra note 20, at 186.
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of interactions and interpretations184 can accelerate the internalization of international
norms.185 The model of interactions postulated by the Transnational Legal Process
School is undoubtedly internal to the mythological system, yet it is no less
“jurisgenerative”186 in that it promotes, via certain reinterpretations of rules, the
transformation of the body of original rules. The analyses of legal techniques of the
Transnational Legal Process School, often grounded in sociology and statistics and
focused on human rights and economic law,187 are thus perfectly suited to the
achievement of the policy-oriented goals of the NHSIL.
Nevertheless, the NHSIL must go further. As Michael Reisman has remarked,
“many of the international efforts to prescribe appropriate international responses to
terrorism have been stalemated by conflicting priorities as to which sanctioning goals
should be pursued.”188 Besides fostering the implementation of minimum international
human rights standards, the NHSIL should now tackle—specifically in the context of
the fight against international terrorism—the twin tasks of defining and implementing
the best values as well as providing individuals with the protection of the fundamental
rights accorded to them by their legal order. The lack of consensus or homogeneity
on these issues keeps jurists, as McDougal noted, from confining themselves to a
technical role and leads them instead to actively seek to clarify and promote these
outcomes. The procedures for coordinating values and standards of protection for

184. There are recognized ideological differences between the two schools, even if the NHSIL can
support commitments on both sides of the political chessboard, as shown by Richard Falk’s work. Recent
judicial default judgments in the wake of the 1996 amendment to the FSIA and the Civil Liberty Act have
“broadened the scope for judicial action and of potential liability for acts of terrorism.” W. Michael
Reisman & Monica Hakimi, Illusion and Reality in the Compensation of Victims of International Terrorism,
54 ALA. L. REV. 561, 567 (2003). These judgments,
while producing unprecedented awards, were, in a sense, empty victories. . . . The new wave
of international human rights suits in United States courts seemed to have become exercises
of judicial therapy for the families of the victims, and, perhaps, for the courts that entered
default judgments in their favor. From an international legal standpoint, the decisions had
an eerie, autistic national character.
Id. at 573. See, e.g., Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000) (allowing for
$24.54 million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive damages to the family of an
American citizen who was kidnapped and tortured by a terrorist organization); Eisenfeld v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2000) (awarding punitive damages in excess of $300 million to families
and estates of American victims of terrorist suicide bombing on an Israeli passenger bus); Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998) (awarding to the estate of a university student killed in a
suicide bomber attack on a tourist bus in Israel over $227 million, including loss of accretion, pain and
suffering, and punitive damages); Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998)
(awarding former political hostages $9 million, $16 million, and $20 million each, with additional award
of $10 million to each victims’ spouse for tortious injuries by a terrorist organization); Alejandre v. Republic
of Iran, 996 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (awarding each victims’ estates compensatory damages in excess
of $16 million and $45.9 million in punitive damages against the Cuban Air Force for the killing of victims
flying on a humanitarian mission in unarmed, civilian airplanes); see also W. Michael Reisman, An
International Farce: The Sad Case of the PLO Mission, 14 YALE J. INT’L L. 412 (1989).
185. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After
September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 337, 339-34 (2004); Koh, supra note 20.
186. See generally Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
187. See generally Hathaway, supra note 180.
188. Reisman, supra note 169, at 7.
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various rights189 require that decision-makers and scholars have a system “for
clarifying basic goal values for themselves and others, if they are to test specific
doctrines and practices for compatibility with conceptions of human dignity.”190 Some
NHSIL scholars may certainly find the European confidence in the myth of rules
somewhat outdated191 or mythical. Nevertheless, European law and the European conception of public international law provide the NHSIL scholar—charged with “the
responsibility of proposing alternative arrangements so that a better approximation of
political and legal goals can be achieved in the future”192—with a remarkable arsenal
of analytical techniques that may protect fundamental rights, produce diversity of
values, and advance a common goal. As the following two examples illustrate, the integration of this European perspective proves crucial when the question turns to fostering
a “system of world public order, along with the international law that sustains it.”193
First, with regard to values, the NHSIL not only must continue “to make as
explicit as possible the goal values it postulates,”194 but also must investigate
innovative ways to coordinate rules with a diversity of values under a common goal.
Antiterrorist strategies, for instance, have understandably infringed on privacy, mostly,
but not exclusively, within the domains of electronic surveillance, the interception of
telecommunications, and the collection, storing, and processing of data.195 While
American academic debates have focused on excessive infringements within the
United States’ legal order, they have underestimated problems generated by
transnational cooperation in these areas. Transnational cooperation in these domains
has led to problems like those produced by the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act of 2001196 and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002,197 both of which compelled airlines to release passenger information. The
European Community and the United States entered into international agreements
whereby, under the penalty of stricter controls and even fines, all airlines must provide
passenger information (the “Passenger Name Record”) to customs agents and
American security officials.198 On May 20, 2006, the European Court of Justice in

189. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD (1986) (observing
distinctions between universal, general, and particular norms).
190. McDougal, supra note 4, at 189. Cf. Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A
Sketch, 8 EUR. J. INT’L L. 566, 577 (1997) (“[T]here is no given hierarchy between universal and local but
which is to prevail is always relative to a measure outside the dichotomy, a measure whose validity is
equally relative to what one isolates as the significant elements of the individual instance.”).
191. See Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and Renewal, 16 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 113, 117 (noting that notwithstanding diminished European power in the international arena,
Europe’s academics still speak “the language of universal international law,” and focus on “jus cogens and
obligations erga omnes as the antidote to a fragmentation of the law into special regimes representing special
interests”).
192. Reisman, supra note 169, at 6.
193. W. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, In Defense of World Public Order, 95 AM. J. INT’L L.
833, 833 (2001).
194. McDougal, supra note 4, at 186.
195. See Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism—Protection of Human Rights:
The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest—The Proper Balance, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 36-45
(2004) (cataloguing various anti-terror intelligence methods that infringe privacy rights).
196. Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597.
197. Pub. L. No. 107-173, 116 Stat. 543.
198. Commission Decision 2004/535, On the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Contained in the
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Luxembourg declared null and void the accord that had been reached on May 28,
2004, between the European Community and the United States authorizing the release
of Passenger Name Records.199 The court did not find it necessary to examine the
other grounds suggested by the European Parliament in its request for the annulment—
in particular, whether the agreement violated either the principle of proportionality or
fundamental rights protected by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.200 The judgment, as rendered, did not create an obstacle to future bilateral
agreements between the European Union Member States and the United States. The
success of any future agreements of this kind, however, likely depends on reconciling
the differences between American and European perceptions of individual privacy and
appropriate means of its protection.201 Robert Post has convincingly suggested that this
difference stems from American conceptions of liberty and European conceptions of
dignity.202 Following in his footsteps, James Q. Whitman has gone the furthest in
rejecting the shallow universalist intuitionism present in the legal arena to propose the
idea of a juridified intuitionism, a differentiation of American privacy law as a body
of law caught in the gravitational orbit of values of liberty and a European privacy law
as a body of law caught in the orbit of dignity.203 Antiterrorist measures will not only
blur but also deeply transform the distinction between the two orbits of privacy.
Whereas Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, in their seminal work on the right of
privacy,204 sought to introduce a continental-style right to privacy into American law,
it may be asserted, at least for the moment, that antiterrorism is increasingly
Americanizing the European conception of privacy. In this respect, the New Haven
School would do well to engage more actively in the definition and promotion of rules
for the diversification of values.
In a closely-related domain, one concept in particular comes to mind: the “national
margin of appreciation,”205 by which international courts exercise both restraint and
flexibility when reviewing the decisions of national authorities. The European Court

Passenger Name Record of Air Passengers Transferred to the United States Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11 (E.C.); Council Decision 2004/496, On the Conclusion of an Agreement
Between the European Community and the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, 2004 O.J. (L 183) 83 (E.C.).
199. Joined Cases C-317/04 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council, Parliament v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R.
I-04721 ¶¶ 67-74.
200. Id. ¶¶ 50, 61, 70.
201. See Heike Krieger, Limitations on Privacy, Freedom of Press, Opinion and Assembly as a Means
of Fighting Terrorism, in TERRORISM AS A CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
SECURITY VERSUS LIBERTY 51, 53-60 (Christian Walter et al. eds., 2004) (juxtaposing the European and
United States approaches to privacy protection by comparing Rotaru v. Romania, 2000-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 156
(holding that storage and use of personal information in a police file, together with refusal of right of
correction, amounts to interference with private life under Article 8), with Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598
(1977) (holding state statute requiring that physicians share prescription drug information with the state
constituted a “reasonable exercise of [the state’s] broad police powers,” and thus did not violate patients’
constitutionally protected privacy rights)).
202. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001).
203. See generally James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
204. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
205. For integration of this idea into a more systematized arrangement, see MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY,
LES FORCES IMAGINANTES DU DROIT—LE RELATIF ET L’UNIVERSEL 64-74 (2004).
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of Human Rights has applied this doctrine extensively, beginning as early as its 1976
decision in the Handyside case in which the Court set forth its conception of the
limited power of appreciation of parties to the European Convention on Human Rights,
with supervision of the exercise of that power by the Court and the European
Commission on Human Rights.206 Subsequently, the Court indicated several elements
to be taken into account, such as the comparative advantage of local authorities, the
indeterminacy of the applicable standard, and the nature of the contested interests.
Although several recent judgments and opinions of the International Court of
Justice—the Oil Platforms207 and Avena208 cases, and the advisory opinion on the Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory209
—“highlight the uncertain status of the margin of appreciation doctrine in the Court’s
jurisprudence,”210 this doctrine should be introduced firmly into general international
law. Following his emphasis on legal technique, the NHSIL scholar could focus on
defining the appropriate norms to which this concept could be applied and the degree
of judicial deference to be accorded in the application of the doctrine.
Second, the internationalization of the fight against terrorism211 has been reduced
to a number of domestic matters: the definition of terrorism, the criminalization of
terrorism, terrorism financing, participation in a terrorist group, and extradition of
suspected terrorists.212 The real difficulty, however, is that the internationalization of
the fight against terrorism is forcing even the most formalist thinkers to reinvent the
techniques of rule application so as to accommodate the coexistence of conflicting
standards. Research surrounding the implementation of United Nations Security
Council resolutions to freeze the assets of alleged terrorists exemplifies the need to
invent new ways for the implementation of rules to promote the common goal.213 If
it is obvious that some human rights obligations are opposable to both the United
Nations and to its Member States, “it remains to be seen how the UN and its Member

206. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1976).
207. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 90 (Nov. 6). In his separate opinion, Judge Buergenthal
noted that the majority’s opinion represents a regression on the part of the Court from its application of the
doctrine in the Nicaragua judgment. See id. ¶ 37 (separate opinion of Judge Buergenthal).
208. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 128 (Mar. 31).
209. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
210. Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 907, 907 (2005).
211. Jean-Paul Laborde & Michael DeFeo, Problems and Prospects of Implementing UN Action Against
Terrorism, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1087 (2006).
212. See Andrea Bianchi, Security Council’s Anti-Terror Resolutions and their Implementation by
Member States, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1044 (2006).
213. See ERIKA DE WET, THE CHAPTER VII POWERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 352-57
(2004). Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Security Council adopted several resolutions
calling on all the Member States of the United Nations to freeze the funds and other financial resources of
persons and entities associated with the Taliban, Usama Bin Laden, and the Al-Qaeda network. Id. The
Security Council gave a Sanction Committee responsibility for identifying the persons concerned and for
keeping the list up to date; resolutions were put into effect within the European Community by Council
Regulations ordering the freezing. Id. This approach should be compared with cases in the United States,
where the federal government is in charge of defining who is listed. See, e.g., Islamic Am. Relief Agency
v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d
156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
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States should implement SC anti-terror resolutions in a manner that can be deemed
consistent with human rights law.”214 In resolving this difficulty, the NHSIL scholar
would have to define the maximum extent of the discretionary powers of the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter after almost two decades of constant
expansion.215 Once the NHSIL scholar comprehends the true extent of the Security
Council’s discretion, and recognizes that the Council’s Chapter VII powers to act in
diverse arenas create a sort of “legality of exception,” the NHSIL scholar will be
ideally positioned to define a standard of review to be applied to Security Council
actions. Decision-makers have approached this question under various circumstances,
three of which are relevant here. First, in at least one instance, the International Court
of Justice prudently declined, or at least postponed, exercise of its power to review
Security Council action.216 Second, in deciding matters relating to its establishment
and jurisdiction pursuant to Security Council Resolution 827, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) explicitly acknowledged that
although the Security Council’s Chapter VII powers are not “unlimited,” they are
adequate to establish the Tribunal.217 Finally, in several cases,218 The Court of First
Instance of the European Communities has, without reference to a specific enabling
rule, found itself competent to review the internal legality of Security Council
resolutions under a jus cogens standard,219 while at the same time finding that it was
not competent to review such internal lawfulness according to either European

214. Bianchi, supra note 212, at 1063.
215. See Bore Eveno, Le contrôle juridictionnel des résolutions du conseil de sécurité: vers un
constitutionnalisme international?, 90 REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INT’L PUB. 827 (2006); CATHERINE
DENIS, LE POUVOIR NORMATIF DU CONSEIL DE SÉCUREITÉ DES NATIONS UNIES: PORTÉE ET LIMITES (2004).
Both authors would likely endorse the Kelsenian idea that in terrorism, as in peace, the Security Council
may not limit itself to the application of the rules of international law but should strive to create new ones.
See HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 294-95 (4th prtg. 1964).
216. See Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3, 15 (Provisional Measures,
Order of Apr. 14) (noting that the court’s refusal to grant Libya’s request for provisional measures—based
on a recognition that doing so would be prejudicial to the rights enjoyed by the United Kingdom by virtue
of the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 748—did not in any way amount to a ruling on the legal
effect of the Resolution 748 and that “whatever the situation previous to the adoption of that resolution, the
rights claimed by Libya under the Montreal Convention cannot now be regarded as appropriate for
protection by the indication of provisional measures”).
217. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 28 (Oct. 2, 1995). Although the Appeals Chamber’s affirmation of jurisdiction
relied on the Security Council’s powers under Article 39 to “determine the existence of any threat to the
peace” and to recommend remedial measures, the court also noted that a predicate determination by the
Security Council “is not a totally unfettered discretion, as it has to remain, at the very least, within the limits
of the Purposes and Principles of the Charter.” Id. ¶ 29.
218. See, e.g., Case T-49/04, Hassan v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. II-00052; Case T-253/02, Ayadi v. Council,
2006 E.C.R. II-02139; Case T-306/01, Yusuf v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-03533; Case T-315/01, Kadi v.
Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-03649.
219. Yusuf, 2005 E.C.R. II-03533 ¶¶ 277-82 (defining jus cogens as a form of higher international law,
inviolable by any state, and inferring that such internationally recognized peremptory norms would limit
the binding effect of any Security Council resolution); but see Bianchi, supra note 212, at 1068 (noting that
undesirable results may flow from a decision-maker’s pronouncement that a Security Council Resolution
is contrary to jus cogens in any particular case).
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Community law220 or the U.N. Charter.221 Such a jus cogens inquiry would ultimately
lead to a definition of the pertinent standards for review: they could promote either a
“microconstitutional” sort of review,222 such as in the Tadic case where the ICTY
refers to the U.N. Charter as the constitutive act pursuant to which Security Council
resolutions are deemed lawful or not, or a “macroconstitutional” sort of review that
would refer beyond the Charter itself to international society in its entirety, whose
structure would be defined by the Charter, and to norms like jus cogens, whose content
should then be more precisely defined. With respect to this and other matters, the fight
against terrorism requires even the most rigorous legal positivists, in the Kelsenian
normativist tradition, to rethink the relationship between different types and orders of
rules. At this stage of its own development, the NHSIL should tackle this issue, for
only by doing so will it effectively promote the common goals and values it stands for.
No other theory can so easily understand how these rules are part of a myth system and
simultaneously use and transform this myth system to promote its own goals.
In the same way that the NHSIL took up and furthered the perspectives of the
New Haven School of the 1930s, it is likely that a New NHSIL will take up and further
the work of the NHSIL. Complying with international norms, unifying the international legal order, and diversifying values are without doubt the major tasks that
would face a New NHSIL. While their progress has at times been thwarted before it
reached maturity, it is important to remember that these goals are the brainchildren of
the classic NHSIL, which had the monumental and historic merit not only of
identifying them, but also of making them the center of its activities. It is at this
moment, when French doctrine is open to less formalism and to a “second principle
of unity,”223 that the opportunity to open this dialogue—one that was never truly
begun—should be seized.224 After having been manipulated by myth for far too long,
as Jerome Frank reminds us, and since “the necessary conditions for the development

220. Yusuf, 2005 E.C.R. II-03533 ¶¶ 266-69.
221. Id. ¶ 270. The general approach taken in Yusuf has similarities to the judicial approach described
as a “Solange story” by Wojciech Sadurski. See Wojciech Sadurski, “Solange, Chapter 3": Constitutional
Courts in Central Europe—Democracy—European Union 1 (European Univ. Inst., Dep’t of Law, Working
Paper No. 2006/40), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963757. The German term Solange (so long as)
is borrowed from the name of two judgments of the German Constitutional Court: Solange I, which held
that because European law had not yet reached a level of protection of fundamental rights equivalent to that
provided by national constitutional law, the German Court would continue to review European Community
law according to the standards of the national Constitution; and Solange II, which later held that because
such a level of protection had been reached, the Court would no longer review European Community
legislation according to national-constitutional standards. Id. at 1-2. Sadurski coins the term “Solange,
chapter 3" to refer to the paradoxical positions taken by the Central and Eastern European courts of countries
that have more recently joined the European Union, which seem to return to the reasoning of Solange I,
despite the fact that Solange II has also already been decided. Id. at 5-6. While rejecting the Solange-type
approach of analyzing Security Council action under a European Community legal framework, The Court
of First Instance of the European Communities seems to be creating a sort of “Solange, chapter 4" by
embracing this jus cogens standard with no explicit rule to enable such a review. See supra note 219 and
accompanying text.
222. See Eveno, supra note 215, at 835.
223. See Dupuy, supra note 14, at 207.
224. This way out of strict formalism is expressed in a great deal of French works, although very
differently. See id.; MIREILLE DELMAS-MARTY, TOWARDS A TRULY COMMON LAW: EUROPE AS A
LABORATORY FOR LEGAL PLURALISM (2002); Jouannet, supra note 14.
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of legal technique are still lacking,” as Hans Kelsen said,225 it is now time for doctrine
to benefit from and improve the mechanics of rules in light of the McDouglian
common goal of promoting values with a view to a respect for diversity.

225. KELSEN, Technique, supra note 3, at 261 (translation by the author).

